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Over the last decade or so, addressing financial instability 
has risen to the top of national and international policy agendas. 
Policymakers in general and central banks in particular have been 
allocating increasing resources to the monitoring of potential threats 
to financial stability and the elaboration of frameworks to address 
them effectively. In part, this trend has been driven by the emergence 
of episodes of financial distress that have derailed, or threatened to 
derail, the real economy. The major financial earthquake that has 
engulfed the global financial system since the summer of 2007 is 
bound to strengthen this trend further (see Borio, 2008).
Despite the efforts made, policymakers are still a long way 
from developing a satisfactory operational framework. Tellingly, 
in the financial stability sphere there is nothing like the well 
established apparatus employed in the pursuit of price stability 
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have succeeded in establishing a set of procedures and institutional 
arrangements that command a broad consensus (for example, Nelson, 
2008). By contrast, there is no equivalent agreement on the analytics 
of financial stability and on how best to secure it. Policymakers are 
still looking for a reliable compass.
A widely recognized challenge in developing an operational 
framework for financial stability is measurement: can financial 
stability or its converse, instability, be adequately measured? Can 
the risk and cost of future financial distress be measured with 
sufficient confidence? Measurement influences all the elements 
of the framework. It translates the definition of the goal into 
an operational yardstick. It shapes the strategy that maps the 
goal into the instruments. And it has major implications for the 
institutional setup that implements the framework, most notably 
for the governance structure that ensures the accountability of 
policymakers. In particular, the precision or “fuzziness” with which 
the goal can be measured is crucial.
Taking the measurement challenge seriously, this paper 
highlights the key issues faced in the elaboration of an operational 
framework for financial stability and suggests an outline of the most 
promising way forward. To keep the paper manageable, we focus 
exclusively on crisis prevention, rather than crisis management 
and resolution, and on the architecture of prudential arrangements. 
We thus do not consider several other policies that can have a first-
order impact on financial stability, notably monetary, fiscal, and 
accounting policies.
Our main conclusion is that while the measurement challenge is 
a tall one, it does not prevent policymakers from edging closer toward 
an effective operational framework. In the process of reaching this 
conclusion, we highlight a number of points. First, analytically, it 
is useful to distinguish financial instability from financial distress 
(or a financial crisis). We define financial distress as an event in 
which substantial losses at financial institutions and/or their failure 
cause, or threaten to cause, serious dislocations to the real economy. 
We define financial instability as a situation in which normal-sized 
shocks to the financial system are sufficient to produce financial 
distress, that is, in which the financial system is fragile. Financial 
stability is then the converse of financial instability.
Second, it is important to distinguish the two quite distinct roles 
that measurement performs in an operational framework. One is 
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performing the task. The other is to support the implementation of 
the strategy in real time to achieve the goal. These two roles place 
different demands on measurement. The former calls for ex post 
measurement of financial instability, that is, for assessments of 
whether or not financial instability prevailed at some point in the 
past. The latter puts a premium on ex ante measurement, that is, 
on assessing whether the financial system is fragile today. Both ex 
ante and ex post measurement are fuzzy, but the challenges of ex 
ante measurement are tougher. For ex post measurement, the past 
occurrence of financial distress can provide irrefutable evidence of 
instability; for ex ante measurement, it is more important to identify 
the likelihood and costs of future financial distress. Failure to 
appreciate this distinction can result in misleading conclusions about 
the feasibility and structure of an ideal operational framework.
Third, the performance of ex ante measures of financial 
instability is generally rather poor, although some measures are 
more useful than others. Most techniques provide thermometers 
rather than barometers of financial distress, in that they do not 
permit its identification with a sufficient lead and confidence. Given 
current technology, macroeconomic stress tests, while potentially 
promising, may actually risk lulling policymakers into a false sense 
of security. By contrast, leading indicators rooted in the endogenous 
cycle view of financial instability appear better suited to identify 
general risks of financial distress. These indicators draw on the 
Minsky-Kindleberger tradition, which sees the gradual buildup of 
vulnerabilities associated with aggressive risk-taking as sowing 
the seeds of subsequent strains. The corresponding indicators take 
market signals as contrarian signals of the likelihood of distress: for 
example, unusually low risk premia or unusually strong asset prices 
and credit expansion are taken as harbingers of future financial 
distress (Borio and Lowe, 2002a, 2002b).
Fourth, any operational financial stability framework would 
have a macroprudential, as opposed to microprudential, orientation 
(Crockett, 2000; Borio, 2003a). This orientation is defined by two 
features that follow from the nature of financial instability. One is 
a focus on the financial system as a whole, as opposed to individual 
institutions, paying particular attention to the costs of instability 
in terms of the real economy. The other is a reliance on a notion of 
risk that stresses the potentially destabilizing effects of the collective 
behavior of economic agents, or the endogenous nature of risk. It is 
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generate financial distress in response to normal-sized shocks. To 
varying degrees, these two elements are shared by all the analytical 
approaches to the modeling of financial instability.
Fifth, strengthening the macroprudential orientation of financial 
regulatory and supervisory arrangements has implications for the 
calibration of policy tools with respect to both the cross-sectional 
and time dimensions of aggregate risk in the financial system. In 
the cross-section—that is, with respect to the treatment of risk at 
a point in time across firms—it calls for increasing the weight on 
common exposures relative to institution-specific exposures (that 
is, on systematic relative to idiosyncratic risk). At present, no such 
distinction is formally made. In the time dimension—that is, in 
relation to the evolution of aggregate risk over time—it calls for 
addressing systematically the so-called procyclicality of the financial 
system. The term procyclicality refers to the amplifying (or positive 
feedback) mechanisms that operate within the financial system and 
between the financial system and the real economy and that can cause 
financial instability. While most analytical approaches to financial 
instability point to such mechanisms, the endogenous cycle view 
highlights their operation in both bad and good times. As a result, it 
also stresses the need to restrain the buildup in risk-taking during 
the expansion phase. A more countercyclical orientation of prudential 
arrangements would be a key way of limiting procyclicality. 
Finally, fuzzy measurement shapes a number of features of the 
operational framework. Given the difficulties in ex ante measurement, 
the framework should rely as far as possible on rules rather than 
discretion. Rules put less weight on the real time measurement of the 
likelihood and cost of future financial distress and can act as more 
effective precommitment devices for policymakers. In addition, fuzzy 
measurement, together with the possibility that for long periods the 
system may be unstable without financial distress actually emerging, 
also puts a premium on transparent institutional setups. These need 
to be based on clear mandates that can help ensure the accountability 
of the authorities in charge.
The paper is organized as follows. The first section defines 
financial stability and explores analytical approaches to the 
modeling of instability. The second section discusses in detail the 
role of measurement, including its purposes, the tools available, and 
their strengths and weaknesses, illustrating them with the help 
of simple examples. The third section outlines the most promising 
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pressing analytical questions. In doing this, we draw lessons from 
the current financial crisis. An appendix examines the recent 
performance of leading indicators rooted in the endogenous cycle 
view of instability.
1. finanCial (in)sTabiliTy: DefiniTion anD analyTiCal 
peRspeCTives
Ever since financial stability as a public policy objective has 
risen to prominence, efforts to define it have multiplied. Even so, a 
generally agreed definition that could be the basis for an operational 
framework has remained elusive.
Most definitions of financial stability share three useful elements. 
First, they focus on the financial system as a whole, as opposed to 
individual institutions. Second, they do not consider the financial 
system in isolation, but ultimately measure the economic (welfare) 
benefits and costs in terms of the real economy (economic activity). 
Third, they make an explicit reference to financial instability, the 
converse of stability, which is more concrete and observable.
At the same time, differences abound. Some definitions are very 
broad, including any allocative distortions arising from financial 
frictions relative to an ideal benchmark (Haldane, 2004); others 
are more restrictive, focusing on the absence of episodes of acute 
distress and significant disruptions to the functioning of the system 
(for example, Mishkin, 1999). Some highlight the robustness of the 
financial system to external shocks (for example, Allen and Wood, 
2006; Padoa-Schioppa, 2003); others cover the possibility that the 
financial system may itself be a source of shocks (for example, 
Schinasi, 2004). Some tie the definition closely to the equally common 
but elusive notion of systemic risk (for example, Group of Ten, 2001; 
de Bandt and Hartmann, 2000); others avoid it.
For the purposes of developing an operational framework, 
some definitions are more helpful than others. Broad definitions 
unnecessarily widen the objective to be pursued by the authorities 
and hinder accountability. And, as we argue below, definitions 
that rule out the possibility of the financial system being a source 
of shocks, at least as normally identified, risk being too restrictive 
and misleading.
In this paper we will use the following terminology. We define 
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losses at financial institutions and/or the failure of these institutions 
cause, or threaten to cause, serious dislocations to the real economy, 
measured in terms of output foregone. We define financial instability 
as a set of conditions that is sufficient to result in the emergence of 
financial distress/crises in response to normal-sized shocks. These 
shocks could originate either in the real economy or the financial 
system itself. Financial stability is then defined as the converse of 
financial instability.
While the definition is very rough, it provides a reasonable 
starting point for our analysis. Three characteristics of this 
definition are worth noting. First, it is pragmatic. This is why the 
scope is narrowed to the performance of financial institutions. It 
goes without saying that large fluctuations in asset prices and the 
exchange rate or problems in the balance sheets of governments, 
households, and non-financial enterprises can, by themselves, 
have a sizable impact on output, even if the financial sector is not 
seriously disrupted. Pure sovereign and exchange rate crises are 
examples of the genre. Including them, however, would arguably 
broaden the definition too much from an operational perspective. 
Financial stability mandates are probably best defined narrowly 
in terms of the financial sector, so as to avoid broadening the scope 
of regulation too far.2 
Second, the definition distinguishes episodes of financial distress 
as events from financial instability/stability as properties of the 
financial system. By their nature, properties are harder to identify 
than events, as they may involve the appeal to a counterfactual. For 
example, the system can be unstable even if no financial distress 
materializes for quite some time (see below).
Finally, it is crucial that distress is generated in response to 
a shock that is not of extraordinary size, as it is unreasonable to 
expect the financial system to function effectively regardless of the 
size of the exogenous shocks that hit it (for example, Goodhart, 
2006). Moreover, as discussed next, the analytical approaches to 
financial instability share this characteristic, that is, a normal-
sized shock can generate financial distress through the amplifying 
mechanisms in the system.
2. This does not imply that authorities should not carefully consider the implications 
of developments outside the financial sector for its stability. Far from it! Moreover, the 
broader macroeconomic consequences of strains in the balance sheets of other sectors 
that do not impinge of the financial sector’s stability can be taken into account through 
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1.1 Analytical Perspectives
Analytical approaches to the modeling of financial instability 
vary widely. They thus have different implications for how to set 
up operational frameworks to address it. For our present purposes, 
it is useful to distinguish approaches along three dimensions. 
The dimensions are defined in terms of whether financial crises/
episodes of financial distress are seen as (i) self-fulfilling or driven 
by fundamentals; (ii) the result of endogenous financial cycles or of 
exogenous negative shocks amplified by the system (the endogenous 
cycle versus exogenous shock-amplification views); or (iii) reflecting 
mainly shocks to systematic risk factors or idiosyncratic shocks 
amplified through spillovers across the system.
The first distinction, between crises seen as self-fulfilling or 
fundamentals-driven, has a long pedigree. One of the most influential 
models of banking crises sees them as self-fulfilling (for example, 
Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). In this model, bank runs are driven by 
the belief that others will run, given that a deposit contract satisfies 
customers on a first-come, first-served basis. Illiquidity leads to 
insolvency: banks engage in maturity transformation, and assets can 
be liquidated only at a cost. Multiple equilibria exist, one in which 
the crisis occurs and one in which it does not, without any basis for 
choosing between them.3 In other models, a crisis can occur only if 
the value of the assets falls below a certain threshold, and is in this 
sense driven by fundamentals (threats to solvency) (for example, 
Gorton, 1988; Chari and Jagannathan, 1988). Unique equilibria can 
be achieved, for instance, by restricting agents’ beliefs (for example, 
Morris and Shin, 1998; Rochet and Vives, 2004).
The second distinction, between the endogenous cycle and 
exogenous shock-amplification views of financial instability, is equally 
long-standing. The prevailing formal literature on financial instability 
falls overwhelmingly in the shock-amplification category. The models 
assume a probability distribution for exogenous shocks that, given the 
rest of the structure of the economy, may result in financial distress if 
the realization is sufficiently negative (as in the case of a bad harvest 
or a fall in productivity). By contrast, an older intellectual tradition 
sees financial distress as the natural result of the buildup in risk-
taking over time, owing to self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms 
3. Technically, the equilibrium is chosen based on the artificial notion of sunspots, 
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within the financial system and between it and the real economy. 
These mechanisms lead to the buildup of financial disequilibria, or 
imbalances, that at some point inevitably unwind, thereby generating 
an endogenous cycle. Minsky (1982) and Kindleberger (1996) are 
the authors most closely associated with this view. The model is 
fundamentally dynamic, and the financial system itself plays a key 
role in generating what may appear as the exogenous shock triggering 
distress (such as a fall in asset prices from unsustainable levels). 
In fact, the true shock may well have occurred a long time before 
and would have been positive (for example, a perceived productivity 
improvement or a financial reform), triggering a boom-bust cycle in 
the economy. The actual trigger for the unwinding of the imbalances 
may be exceedingly small and unobservable (for example, a change 
in mood), given the fragility built up in the system. While the precise 
timing of the unwinding is unpredictable, its occurrence is not.
As yet, no formal micro-founded model able to satisfactorily 
capture the endogenous cycle view of instability has been developed. 
At the same time, several models incorporate elements of the overall 
picture. These range from those that explain bubbles in asset prices to 
those that explore the amplification mechanisms that operate within 
the financial system and between the financial system and the real 
economy, as a result of the financial frictions inherent in financial 
contracts.4 A notable example is the mutually reinforcing link between 
credit and asset prices that arises from the use of collateral (Kiyotaki 
and Moore, 1997; Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999).5
The third distinction, between shocks to systematic risk factors—
which, by definition, affect exposures that are common across 
institutions—and idiosyncratic shocks amplified through spillovers, 
relates to the channels through which the crisis propagates; it is also 
less clear-cut than the other two. In models that assume that the 
4. The literature on bubbles is vast. See Allen and Gale (2000a) for a model that 
highlights the role of credit in that context. For a recent overview, see Brunnermeier 
(2001).
5. General equilibrium models with financial frictions that explore the welfare 
properties of these amplification mechanisms normally dispense with financial 
intermediaries altogether, considering only the interaction between entrepreneurs 
and households. Similarly, these models generally do not generate endogenous cycles, 
but highlight the buildup in risk-taking that makes the system fragile to exogenous 
shocks that lead to much tighter financing constraints, thereby amplifying business 
fluctuations. On both of these aspects, see, for example Lorenzoni (2008), Korinek (2008), 
and references therein. For an alternative approach that generates endogenous cycles, 
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financial sector is a single entity, as many do, no such distinction 
exists.6 In those that assume multiple intermediaries, it is sometimes 
assumed that the original deterioration occurs in a specific institution 
and is then transmitted elsewhere through knock-on effects, as a result 
of the balance sheet or behavioral connections that keep the financial 
system together. This is the case, for instance, of approaches that stress 
credit chains, payment and settlement system links, or runs triggered 
by the inability to distinguish solvent from insolvent institutions (for 
example, Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Allen and Gale, 2001; Rochet 
and Tirole, 1996a, 1996b; Freixas and Parigi, 1998; McAndrews and 
Roberds, 1995; Aghion, Bolton, and Dewatripont, 1999). By contrast, 
other approaches highlight a joint deterioration owing to shared 
exposures, such as through the holdings of the same assets (for 
example, Cifuentes, Ferrucci, and Shin, 2005; Allen and Gale, 2004). 
The distinction is less clear-cut than the other two, however, since 
shared exposures to risk factors can be both direct, through similar 
claims on the nonfinancial financial sector, and indirect, through 
balance sheet interlinkages within the financial sector itself.
Beyond the obvious differences, two common characteristics stand 
out. First, all the approaches stress how aggregate risk is endogenous 
with respect to the collective behavior of economic agents. This view 
of aggregate risk contrasts sharply with the way individual market 
participants regard and measure risk, treating it as exogenous with 
respect to their actions. Given the assumed structure of the financial 
system, this collective behavior can amplify small disturbances and 
generate instability, that is, result in strong nonlinearities in the 
response of the system. This amplification is the essence of what 
has come to be known as the procyclicality of the financial system, 
whereby the financial system, rather than acting as a shock absorber, 
acts as a shock amplifier and thus exacerbates business fluctuations 
(Borio, Furfine, and Lowe, 2001; Borio, 2003a). In models that fall 
in the negative shock-amplification paradigm, these mechanisms by 
necessity operate only to reduce output; moreover, the existence of 
asymmetries associated with the bankruptcy constraints means that 
they are especially powerful. In models in the spirit of the endogenous 
cycle paradigm, or in which financial frictions are always present, 
they also operate during the expansion phase.
6. This would apply, for instance, to the systemic interpretation of Diamond and 
Dybvig (1983), that is, thinking of their bank as a whole banking system, rather than 
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Second, two types of fundamental sources of instability are at 
work in the various models, either of which is sufficient to produce it. 
One source is errors in the elaboration of the information available 
to agents, that is, the assumption that expectations are not rational 
or model consistent.7 Most approaches rule out this possibility, given 
the popularity of the rational expectations assumption in modern 
economics. By contrast, such errors are clearly implicit, but not 
required, in variants of the endogenous cycle view, such as those 
of Minsky and Kindleberger. Rationality of expectations is one, 
though not the only, reason why financial accelerator mechanisms 
have persistence-enhancing effects on shocks rather than having a 
larger, nonlinear impact on output of the boom/bust variety. The 
other source of instability is the wedge between individually rational 
and collectively desirable (welfare-enhancing) actions.8 Its specific 
manifestations vary with assumptions concerning the information 
available to economic agents and the types of financial contacts 
and markets in which they transact. Relevant notions here are 
coordination failures, (rational) herding, and prisoner’s dilemmas. 
These are the types of mechanism that explain runs on financial 
institutions, distress sales, or excessive risk-taking in the expansion 
phase of the financial cycle (for example, Rajan, 1994, 2005).9
From a practical perspective, the various approaches have 
implications for the broad contours of an operational framework. 
Some are common to all. In particular, all of them suggest 
strengthening the robustness of the financial system to shocks. An 
uncontroversial way of doing so is to strengthen the payment and 
settlement infrastructure—an aspect which is often taken for granted 
in the models. Another possibility is to improve the information 
available to economic agents. This could reduce the possibility of 
errors in its elaboration or limit the risk of unwarranted contagion. 
Yet another option would be to improve the buffers in the system, 
7. Strictly speaking, the issue is undefined in the case of self-fulfilling crises, 
in which agents do not form expectations over the likelihood of the two types of 
equilibria.
8. In some models, financial instability is actually welfare enhancing, given 
the assumptions made; see Allen and Gale (1998). The assumptions concerning the 
information available to investors or depositors can be key here. For instance, depending 
on the quality of the signal received, wholesale depositors may either induce effective 
market discipline (desirable liquidations) or not (inefficient ones) (compare Calomiris 
and Kahn, 1991, and Huang and Ratnovski, 2008).
9. See Borio, Furfine, and Lowe (2001) for a more detailed discussion and references 
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although their characteristics would very much depend on the details 
of the models (for example, insurance, capital, and liquidity). 
Other implications vary more substantially. The approaches 
differ significantly in terms of the ability to measure the risk of 
financial distress in real time. Taken literally, this is impossible if 
crises are self-fulfilling.10 An assessment may be conceptually easier 
in endogenous-cycle models than in those that stress the exogenous 
shock-propagation paradigm. The approaches also differ in terms of 
the weight to be placed on different factors in that context, including 
liquidity or solvency, interlinkages in the financial system, or 
direct common exposures to systematic risk, separate from those 
linkages. They also differ in terms of the most promising areas for 
policy action. Thus, compared with shock-propagation approaches, 
the endogenous-cycle perspective more strongly highlights the 
desirability of restraining risk-taking in the expansion phase.
2. finanCial (in)sTabiliTy: measuRemenT
Any operational framework designed to secure financial stability 
requires a mapping of the definition of the goal into a measurable, 
or at least observable, yardstick. Measurement performs two quite 
distinct roles. One is to help ensure the accountability of the authorities 
responsible for performing the task. The other is to support the 
implementation of the chosen strategy to achieve the goal in real time. 
The former calls for ex post measurement of financial instability, that 
is, for assessments of whether financial instability prevailed at some 
point in the past. The latter relies on ex ante measurement, that is, 
on assessments of whether the financial system is fragile today. While 
both ex ante and ex post measurement are “fuzzy,” the challenges in 
supporting strategy implementation are tougher.
As a means of ensuring accountability, it is important to 
distinguish two cases, depending on whether an episode that may 
qualify as financial distress occurs during the relevant period. If 
such an episode does take place, ex post measurement difficulties are 
challenging but manageable. In order to conclude that the system 
was unstable, policymakers should be able to (i) recognize financial 
distress ex post; and (ii) reach a judgment that the distress was 
out of proportion with the original exogenous (unavoidable) shock, 
10. More precisely, the likelihood of distress is impossible to measure; the cost 
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that is, that financial distress was the result of financial instability 
rather than extreme shocks. Clearly, even this assessment can 
involve considerable fuzziness. How large should the losses among 
financial intermediaries and the associated costs for the real economy 
be before the episode can qualify as financial distress? How large 
should the shock be? By definition, the answers to both of these 
questions can only be given with reference to a model of the economy, 
however rudimentary. Moreover, where should one draw the line 
between crisis prevention and crisis management? For example, if 
the authorities intervene in response to the first signs of strain to 
manage the situation and thereby avoid the failure of institutions 
(for example, through early recapitalizations or the issuance of 
guarantees), is that distress or its prevention (see the appendix)? 
Nevertheless, overcoming this fuzziness should not be too hard.
Ex post measurement is harder if financial distress has not 
emerged. The main drawback is that the system may actually be 
unstable (fragile) even if no financial distress has materialized. 
Episodes of financial distress are rare, and the window during which 
the system may be fragile without experiencing a financial crisis 
may last years. As a result, it can be hard to judge how well the 
authorities are performing for quite a long time. Judging whether 
the system was unstable during any given recent tranquil period 
requires policymakers to answer the same kind of counterfactual as 
for real time implementation, and hence for ex ante measurement: 
what would have happened had the system been hit by a shock? Or, 
in the endogenous cycle view of financial instability, were imbalances 
building up that simply happened not to unwind during the period? 
In effect, during tranquil periods, the demands on ex ante and ex post 
measurement are qualitatively equivalent, although requirements 
in terms of frequency of observation, lead time, and accuracy are 
lower for the ex post variant.
As a means of implementing the chosen strategy in real time, 
the requirements on measurement are, on balance, more demanding 
than for accountability, since ex ante measurement is inevitable. 
By the time financial distress emerges, it is too late, as the damage 
is done. The requirements are especially demanding as a basis for 
discretionary measures designed to take preventive action. In this 
case, it is necessary to measure the likelihood and cost of future 
episodes of financial distress in real time with a sufficient lead and 
confidence. They are less demanding, however, as a basis for the 
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prudential tools. In this case, measurement can be less ambitious. It 
can be based on less precise proxies of risks of financial distress as 
long as the basic direction of the measures is correct. For instance, it 
would be sufficient to relate prudential measures to rough estimates 
of the financial cycle, based on some long-term averages (see the 
next section).
Another way of highlighting the challenges in ex ante measurement 
is to consider its implications for the properties of measures of 
financial instability. Ex ante measurement calls for good leading, 
as opposed to contemporaneous, measures of episodes of financial 
distress, that is, for good barometers rather than thermometers of 
distress. Given the lead-lag relationships involved, such measures 
would also be good thermometers of financial instability; that is, 
they would be able to capture the financial system’s fragility before 
financial distress actually emerges. A key challenge here is what 
might be called the paradox of instability: the financial system 
can appear strongest precisely when it is most fragile. This puts a 
premium on the policymakers’ ability to read the tea leaves correctly 
(for example, Knight, 2007).
2.1 A Taxonomy
In considering the possible range of measurement tools, it 
might be helpful to start from what an ideal measure would be. 
This measure would be the output of a fully structural model of the 
economy mapping instruments into the goal. More precisely, it could 
be written as follows:
M ← f (X,I,u),
where the measure of financial (in)stability, M, is some transformation 
of the output of a structural model of the economy, f(.), linking a set 
of variables, X, to policy instruments, I, and exogenous shocks, u. 
Such a model would permit the ex post identification of financial 
instability by decomposing the past into shocks and the endogenous 
response of the system. It could also be used to generate the ex ante 
probability distribution of outcomes and hence of financial distress, 
through the simulation of the shocks, or, alternatively, to generate 
scenarios (that is, trace the behavior of the system conditional 
on specific shocks). And it could support the design appropriate 
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configurations of the instruments. For example, the tools would 
ideally generate a metric of the expected cost of financial distress 
over a specific horizon, combining the likelihood of financial distress 
with its cost in terms of economic activity. The authorities could then 
use this measure as the basis for the calibration of both automatic 
stabilizers and discretionary actions aimed at keeping it within a 
desired range.
Reality falls well short of this ideal. In fact, it falls well short 
even of the less ambitious, but more realistic setup that characterizes 
the world of monetary policymaking, to which those working on 
financial stability often aspire (for example, Goodhart, 2006). In 
monetary policy, the quantitative side of the job is much more 
developed. Policymakers have models that link instruments to the 
goal (some varying combination of inflation and output) and use 
them to make forecasts and carry out policy simulations (Nelson, 
2008). Typically, a variety of such tools are employed, exploiting 
their relative strengths and weaknesses in forecasting and policy 
analysis. The tools are quite helpful in disciplining the inevitable 
and crucial role of judgment, and they can be used to keep measures 
of price stability, such as a point-estimate for inflation over a given 
horizon, within desired ranges. This is the most common approach 
in inflation-targeting regimes.
The picture is quite different in financial stability analysis. There 
are no satisfactory models of the economy as a whole linking balance 
sheets in the financial sector to macroeconomic variables. Even 
the empirical modeling of financial instability within the financial 
sector, for given (exogenous) macroeconomic factors, is often very 
primitive, hardly going beyond rather mechanical exercises with 
very limited behavioral content (for example, Upper, 2007).11 If any 
instrument at all is included in the model, it is the interest rate, 
11. The work by Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos (2004, 2006a, 2006b) provides 
an interesting exception. These papers theoretically derive general equilibrium models 
with incomplete markets, heterogeneous agents, and the possibility of endogenous 
default. Ultimately, however, calibrating and finding computational solutions for the 
model are the major difficulties. So far this has only been tried for the United Kingdom 
(Goodhart, Sunirand, and Tsomocos, 2006b) and Colombia (Saade, Osorio, and Estrada, 
2007). In both cases, it was only possible to implement a highly stylized model with three 
different banks, two states of the world (stress and no stress), and two time periods. 
Even in this case, calibration proved difficult. As Saade, Osorio, and Estrada (2007) 
explain, some parameters such as policy variables are observed, some can be calibrated 
using econometric methods, and others, which are at the heart of the model, can only 
be arbitrarily imposed. Moreover, these models are based on endowment economies, 
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whose primary function is to achieve price stability. All this makes 
it virtually impossible to do meaningful risk analysis and policy 
simulations within a single framework. Policymakers have to fall 
back on a variety of much more limited quantitative tools that put 
little discipline on judgment.
In surveying the landscape of such tools, it is useful to classify 
them along three dimensions. First, how far do the models provide 
leading, as opposed to contemporaneous, measures of episodes of 
financial distress? In other words, how far do they act as barometers 
rather than thermometers of financial distress? This affects the uses 
to which those measures can be put. Second, how far do the tools 
take into account, directly or indirectly, the behavioral interactions 
that underlie episodes of financial distress? Failure to capture such 
interactions—that is, the endogenous nature of aggregate of risk with 
respect to collective behavior—can easily lead to underestimating 
the likelihood of financial distress. Third, how far do the models 
actually tell a story about the transmission mechanism of financial 
distress?12 Being able to tell a convincing story can influence the 
models’ effectiveness in communicating risks and possibly give more 
confidence in the outputs. However, there is sometimes a trade-off 
between the granularity and degree of detail needed for story telling 
and accuracy in measurement.13
We focus on tools that are actually used at present in policy 
institutions. We start with a variety of indicators, ranging from 
traditional balance sheet variables to more ambitious early warning 
indicators (EWIs). We then discuss vector autoregressions (VARs), 
which amount to very simple representations of the economy and 
could, in principle, perform both risk and policy analysis. We finally 
consider current systemwide multi-module measurement models, of 
which macroeconomic stress tests are the prime example. We illustrate 
the performance of these tools with some representative examples.
12. This is close to the distinction between structural and reduced-form models. 
The term structural model is often used to refer to models whose parameters are 
invariant with respect to policy interventions (so-called deep parameters), so that policy 
simulations can be properly carried out. Given the state of modeling financial stability, 
this would simply mean setting the bar too high. We return to this issue in the next 
section, where we briefly discuss the implications for monetary policy of the inability 
to model financial distress satisfactorily.
13. For example, simple econometric models, such as autoregressive specifications, 
may outperform the true model of the data-generating process in forecast performance 
(Clements and Hendry, 1998). However, autoregressive specifications are certainly not 
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2.1.1 From balance sheet to market price indicators
The simplest type of indicator comprises statistics based on 
balance sheet items. These would include, for example, measures 
of banks’ capitalization, nonperforming loans, loan loss provisions, 
items on the balance sheets of households and corporations, and so 
forth. Most of the so-called financial soundness indicators listed by 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) fall in this category (IMF, 
2008). National authorities would also have, in addition, data for 
individual institutions at a more granular level.
At best, these variables can be used as inputs into a richer analysis 
of vulnerabilities.14 Crucially, given accounting rules, variables such as 
loan loss provisions, nonperforming loans, and levels of capitalization 
are rather backward-looking and, at best, contemporaneous, rather 
than leading, indicators of financial distress (that is, thermometers 
rather than barometers). Indeed, profits tend to be rather high, and 
provisions low, when risk is taken on; the recent experience has been no 
different in this respect (figure 1). The same is true for variables such 
as balance sheet and income leverage. In order to become useful from a 
forward-looking perspective, they need to be embedded in a theory of the 
dynamics of instability, such as the endogenous cycle view, that links 
them explicitly to future episodes of financial distress (see below).
By construction, similar limitations apply to indices that combine 
balance sheet variables into a single number to generate an index of 
stress, possibly together with other variables.15 These indices have 
the advantage of summarizing a wide set of information into one 
statistic, which can then be used as an input into a more refined 
assessment. At the same time, they are not very transparent.
Ratings for individual borrowers go one step beyond balance 
sheet variables. The ratings could be issued by credit rating 
14. A typical process is described in Carson and Ingves (2003) through a so-called 
transmission map, which traces the impact of possible macroeconomic and financial 
shocks through the nonfinancial sector on the financial system, as well as the feedback 
into the real economy. See also Gadanecz and Jayaram (2009), who provide an overview 
of the use of indicators in current financial stability reports. 
15. Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock (2000) were among the first to aggregate 
indicators into a single index. Their index is based on four annual series: the bank loan 
charge-off rates, business failure rates, the (ex post) real interest rate, and the quality 
spread. To aggregate, they first compute a standardized distance from the median for 
each variable. The average of the standardized distances is then split into five buckets, 
from severe distress to euphoria, to generate an index of financial conditions. Similarly, 
Hanschel and Monnin (2005) build a stress index for Switzerland by aggregating balance 
sheet variables, such as provisions or capital levels, with market data for banks and 
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agencies or by supervisory authorities, based on more confidential 
information. Relative to balance sheet variables, ratings have the 
advantages of combining information into a single statistic and of 
being designed to be forward-looking. Specifically, they are estimates 
of the probability of default or expected loss. They have a couple 
of important limitations, however. First, they relate to individual 
institutions taken in isolation. Thus, a measure of the strength of 
the financial system as a whole requires the bottom-up aggregation 
of ratings that do not take systematic account of common exposures 
and interactions. Second, their reliability as truly leading indicators 
of financial distress is questionable, at least in the case of credit 
agencies’ ratings. In practice, downgrades tend to be rather sticky 
compared with the arrival of information. To a considerable extent, 
this reflects the fact that such ratings seek to filter out the influence 
Figure 1. Profits and Provisioning
Percent of total assets
A. Pretax profits
B. Provisioning expenses
Source: BIS annual reports from 2003 to 2008.80 Claudio Borio and Mathias Drehmann
of the business cycle, that is, to be through-the-cycle rather than 
point-in-time estimates of default. As a result, they are more helpful 
in assessing the structural and idiosyncratic determinants of default 
than in delineating its evolution over time.16
An alternative procedure is to build indicators of financial distress 
from market prices. There are various possibilities. At one end, raw 
indicators can be considered either in isolation or combined, with little 
or no theoretical restrictions. Typical variables include volatilities and 
quality spreads. By imposing some structure, prices of fixed income 
securities and equities can be used to derive estimates of default 
probabilities or expected losses for individual institutions and sectors. 
This requires a pricing model that reverse engineers the various inputs, 
based on some assumption. For example, so-called expected default 
frequencies (EDFs, which are basically probabilities of default) can be 
obtained from equity prices, recalling that equity can be regarded as 
a call on the firm’s assets just as its debt is a put on assets (Merton, 
1974). Once again, these individual inputs can then be aggregated, 
based on some estimates of correlations across the firms’ assets, to 
obtain a measure of distress for the corresponding sector.
On the face of it, such indicators have a number of advantages 
over those discussed so far. They are forward-looking measures that 
incorporate all the information available to market participants at 
a particular point in time, that is, they are comprehensive, point-in-
time measures of risk. They therefore implicitly embed views about 
any common exposures and interactions that may exist within the 
sector covered. They are also available at high frequencies.
At the same time, they may have drawbacks. Depending on 
the characteristics of the financial system, their coverage may be 
too narrow (for example, few institutions may be publicly quoted). 
Another problem is distinguishing between the market’s view of 
future cash flows and the price it assigns to them, that is, the risk 
premium. If the purpose is to identify future distress, rather than to 
determine the price attached to it or to measure current conditions, 
then the influence of the risk premium should be filtered out. This 
requires several assumptions and is hard to do with any confidence. 
More importantly, though, any biases in the market’s assessment 
would be embedded in the estimates. If excessive risk-taking is the 
16. In addition, most rating agency assessments include the probability of external 
support, including government support, in the assessment. From a policy perspective, 
this should be filtered out. Some ratings seek to do precisely that (for example, Fitch 
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source of financial instability, as some analytical approaches suggest, 
then estimates of risk derived from market prices would tend to be 
unusually low as vulnerabilities build up and would tend to behave 
more like contemporaneous indicators of financial distress.17 
Available evidence tends to confirm that the lead with which 
market prices point to distress is uncomfortably short for policy. For 
example, unusually low volatilities and narrow spreads prevailed 
across a broad spectrum of asset classes until the turmoil started 
in the summer of 2007, when they then rose sharply (BIS, 2007; 
figure 2). Figure 3 illustrates this point based on two representative 
indices of stress, which differ with respect to the degree to which 
they are constrained by theoretical priors. Figure 3 (panel A) shows 
an index of stress for the United States based on the methodology 
developed by Illing and Liu (2006) and first applied to Canada. In 
essence, the index is a weighted sum of market based indicators 
for the banking sector, debt markets, equity markets, and liquidity 
measures. Figure 3 (panel B) plots the price of insurance against 
systemic distress developed by Tarashev and Zhu (2008); based on 
banks’ credit default swap (CDS) spreads, the index calculates the 
premium that needs to be paid for insurance against losses that 
exceed a certain threshold in terms of overall assets of the banks 
covered with a given probability.18 As can be seen, both indicators 
start going up sharply only after the turmoil in financial markets 
erupted in the second half of 2007.19
17. This would reflect a combination of high risk appetite and excessively benign 
views about future cash flows. To quote Greenspan (2005): “history has not dealt kindly 
with the aftermath of protracted periods of low risk premiums.”
18. Avesani, Pascual, and Li (2006) derive a similar indicator, seeking to estimate 
the likelihood that more than one bank defaults, based on a latent factor model for an nth 
to default CDS basket. As in the case of Tarashev and Zhu (2008), the indicator refers 
to risk-neutral probabilities, that is, probabilities weighted by agents’ risk aversion. 
Thus, care should be taken when drawing inferences. An alternative approach is to 
derive stress indicators based on Merton models for banks (for example, Segoviano 
and Goodhart, 2007) or the whole economy (for example, Gray, Merton, and Zvi, 2006). 
Other market-based measures of the likelihood of codistress among banks have been 
estimated by applying extreme value theory to stock prices (Hartman, Vries, and 
Streatmans, 2005), the conditional comovement of large abnormal bank stock returns 
(Gropp and Moerman, 2004), and comovements in value-at-risk measures (Adrian 
and Brunnermeier, 2007). The basic message highlighted in the text would also apply 
to these indicators. Some of these measurement approaches have also been run in a 
stress-testing mode (for example, Xin, Zhou, and Zhu, 2008); see below.
19. Researchers have also developed indicators based on combinations of balance 
sheet and market price data (for example, Bordo, Dueker, and Wheelock, 2000). 
Depending on the precise combination and calibration procedures, their properties 
would lie somewhere in between the two types.Figure 2. Buoyant Asset Markets
A. Asset and commodity pricesa
B. Bond spreadsd,e
C. Implied volatilitiesd
Sources: Bloomberg; Datastream; Merrill Lynch; J.P. Morgan Chase; Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD); national data.
a. 1995 = 100. b. Sixteen OECD countries; weighted averages based on 2000 GDP and PPP exchange rates. c. 
Goldman Sachs Commodity Index, in U.S. dollar terms. d. Quarterly averages. e. In basis points. f. As of December 
1997, simple average of U.S. and euro area high-yield indices; otherwise only U.S. g. Estimated for ten-year zero 
coupon Treasury bonds. h. Simple average of U.S. and Germany. i. Derived from the price of call option contracts 
on stock market indices. j. Price volatility implied by the price of call options on ten-year government bond futures 
contracts. k. J.P. Morgan benchmark index for the level of G7 currencies’ implied volatility.Figure 3. Market Stress Indexes 
A. Financial Stress Index  
for the United Statesa
B. Price of insurance against systemic distress  
by financial segmentb
Sources: Bankscope; Datastream; national data; Markit; BIS calculations.
a. De-meaned variance-weighted average (from 1995) of the following indicators: bank bond spread (banks’ long-term 
bond yield against U.S. Treasury bonds), corporate bond spread (corporate long-term bond yield against U.S. Treasury 
bonds), liquidity spread (three-month U.S. dollar LIBOR against Treasury bills), interest rate spread (long-term U.S. 
Treasury bond yield against three-month Treasury bills), banks’ beta (covariance between bank and total market 
equity returns / variance of total market returns), and CMAX of equity (index current value / one-year high). For 
more detailed definitions of individual indicators and different weighting methods, see Illing and Liu (2006). 
b. In percent. Based on credit default swap (CDS) spreads for ten commercial and eight investment banks 
headquartered in North America, 16 universal banks headquartered in Europe, and 14 insurance companies 
headquartered in the United States and Europe. Risk neutral expectation of credit losses that equal or exceed 15 
percent of the corresponding segments’ combined liabilities in 2006 (per unit of exposure to these liabilities). Risk 
neutral expectations comprise expectations of actual losses and preferences.84 Claudio Borio and Mathias Drehmann
2.1.2 Early warning indicators 
One possible way of overcoming these limitations is to develop 
formal early warning indicators (EWIs) of financial distress. These 
are specifically designed to identify episodes of financial distress in 
advance. There is a growing literature on EWIs. Although most of it 
was initially concerned with exchange rate and sovereign crises (for 
example, Berg and Pattillo, 1998), banking crises have been attracting 
growing attention (for example, Bell and Pain, 2000; Demirgüç-
Kunt and Detragiache, 2005; Davis and Karim, 2008). The basic 
approach consists in using reduced-form relationships linking a set of 
explanatory variables to a financial distress index.20 This is generally 
a zero/one variable, except in Misina and Tkacz (2008), who forecast 
the Canadian stress index developed by Illing and Liu (2006) using 
measures of credit and asset prices (see the discussion above). 
Potentially, EWIs have some attractive features. They represent 
statistically rigorous attempts to identify basic relationships in 
the historical data. They are explicitly forward-looking. They 
implicitly capture any interactions that have existed in previous 
episodes. Finally, they might be able to help frame broad stories 
about the factors behind distress, as long as their structure is not 
purely data driven, but rather is inspired by some analytical view 
of distress. True, by construction they can only provide an estimate 
of the likelihood of distress, not of its costs, but some rough idea 
of the costs can be derived from those associated in the past with 
the episodes of distress used in the calibration. 
Their performance so far, however, has also revealed a number 
of shortcomings. The forecasting horizon in often quite short, more 
relevant for investors than policymakers (for example, typically 
not exceeding one year and sometimes as short as one month). The 
prediction may include information that is actually not available at 
the time the prediction is made (see Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999). 
The choice of independent variables may be excessively data driven, 
so that the story is not obvious and there may be a risk of overfitting 
at the cost of out-of-sample performance. They have a tendency to 
produce too many false positives, that is, to predict crises that do not 
20. The statistical methodology ranges from threshold models calibrated based on 
noise-to-signal ratios (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999) to multivariate regressions (for 
example, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998, 2005). Mixtures of the two are also 
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occur, and their performance tends to be rather poor (Bell and Pain, 
2000). More generally, there is no guarantee that past relationships 
will hold in the future.21
In research with colleagues, we have sought to develop simple 
indicators that overcome some of these limitations (for example, 
Borio and Lowe, 2002a, 2002b). The indicators aim to predict 
banking crises over horizons ranging from one to four years ahead, 
depending on the calibration. They rely exclusively on information 
that is available at the time the predictions are made, so they are 
truly real-time. They are quite parsimonious, relying on two or at 
most three variables, as they draw heavily on the endogenous cycle 
view of financial instability. The basic idea is that the coexistence of 
unusually rapid credit expansion and asset price increases points to 
the buildup of financial imbalances that at some point are likely to 
unwind. The indicators are intended to measure the coexistence of 
asset price misalignments with a limited capacity of the system to 
absorb the asset price reversal. Misalignments are simply captured 
by deviations of asset prices from a (one-sided) trend, while the 
absorption capacity of the system is captured by deviations of the 
ratio of private sector debt to GDP from a similar trend, with both 
exceeding certain thresholds. The precise timing of the unwinding 
is impossible to predict, so we use flexible, long horizons. 
In sample, the performance of these indicators is encouragingly 
good, with comparatively low noise-to-signal ratios despite their 
parsimony. This alleviates the false positive problem. As a result, 
Fitch Ratings (2005) is now using a variant of this methodology to 
implement a top-down assessment of systemic risks, complementing 
its bottom-up approach based on individual banks’ ratings.
How would those indicators have performed more recently? In the 
appendix, we take a preliminary shot at this question by extending 
the indicators to incorporate property prices, based on additional data. 
We estimate the indicators for a sample of industrial countries over 
the period 1970 to 2003, and we do an out-of-sample forecast.22
A number of conclusions stand out. First, the indicator does 
identify the emergence of problems in the United States, the country 
21. Likewise, they cannot be used consistently to generate counterfactual stories 
based on alternative policy responses, as they normally do not include instruments. 
In fact, changes in policy regimes may be one reason why past relationships need not 
hold in future.
22. See Borio and Drehmann (2009) for a more detailed discussion of the issues 
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at the epicenter of the crisis, with a lead of at least a couple of years. 
Second, it picks up most of the countries that have taken measures 
to prop up their banking systems, but it misses those where the 
problems originated in foreign exposures, in this case to strains 
in the United States. This highlights an obvious limitation of the 
indicator in an increasingly globalized world: it is implicitly based 
on the assumption that the banks resident in one country are only 
exposed to financial cycles in that country. Third, there are only a 
couple of cases in which false positive signals are issued, in countries 
that have seen sizable booms but as yet no financial distress. This last 
point depends on the specific definition of what constitutes a crisis, 
which is especially ambiguous in real time, when governments decide 
to take preemptive measures aimed at forestalling insolvencies or 
keeping their systems from being at a competitive disadvantage. 
The global response to the current crisis is quite unique in this 
regard. Overall, we conclude that despite its obvious limitations, 
this approach is rather promising as a way of identifying general 
vulnerabilities associated with credit and asset price booms.
2.1.3 Single-module measures: VARs
In  the  absence  of  structural  econometric  models,  vector 
autoregressions (VARs) could be useful for carrying out stability 
analysis. VARs are largely data-driven representations of the economy, 
with few theoretical restrictions. Typically, a rather small set of 
variables are allowed to interact dynamically, with the dynamics 
ultimately driven by a set of exogenous shocks. In principle, the tool 
could be rather versatile if financial distress could be defined in terms 
of some of those variables (for example, financial institutions’ losses 
exceeding a certain threshold). Through simulations, it can generate a 
probability distribution of outcomes for the endogenous variables and 
hence a measure of the probability of distress over any given horizon. 
For example, the tool could be used to calculate a value-at-risk (VaR) 
metric for the variable of interest. Alternatively, it could generate the 
implied value for the variable of interest, conditional on an assumed set 
of shocks. If the chosen shocks are outside the typical range observed 
in the sample, this procedure is akin to carrying out a stress test.
In theory, VARs are quite appealing. Depending on the horizon 
over which the forecasts are made, they can truly act as barometers, 
rather than thermometers, of financial distress, providing a rich 
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account interactions between variables and hence feedback effects. 
They can also provide the basis for some story telling, tracing the impact 
of propagation of shocks through the system, although the parameters 
of the VAR are not amenable to a structural interpretation.
In practice, however, VARs fall well short of this promise. The 
variables typically used to capture financial distress are rather 
rudimentary, such as nonperforming loans or defaults in the corporate 
sector, and poorly modeled. Data limitations are a problem. The 
representation of the financial sector is cut to the bone, and the range 
of possible shocks is quite limited, as the models have to be kept 
manageable for estimation and often exclude asset prices, which are 
hard to incorporate beyond a general equity price index. The lack of 
structure implies that the models have very little to say about the 
dynamics of distress, and the assumptions on which the models are 
built make it very hard to detect any fundamental nonlinearities 
associated with financial distress.23 By construction, given their very 
nature and the estimation methods, the models capture average 
relationships among the data series, rather than how the series interact 
under stress, and they are unable to incorporate boom-bust cycles.
This is illustrated in figures 4 and 5, which show the results of a 
simple but representative exercise developed by Hoggarth, Sorensen, 
and Zicchino (2005), who carried out the analysis for the United 
Kingdom. We replicate it for the United States. The VAR consists of 
the output gap, nonperforming loans, inflation, and the short-term 
(three-month) interest rate.24 Two points stand out. First, as indicated 
23. Specifically, the models generally assume that the underlying relationships 
interact in a (log)linear fashion, so that, say, a three-standard-deviation shock has 
exactly the same impact as three times a one-standard-deviation shock. This assumption 
would be acceptable if the underlying data-generating process was linear or the VAR 
was used to study the impact of small shocks around the equilibrium of the process. 
However, stress tests do not consider small shocks, and it is not likely that the relevant 
data-generating processes are all log-linear over the relevant range. Drehmann, Patton, 
and Sorensen (2006) explore the log-linearity assumption and the impact of large 
macroeconomic shocks on aggregate liquidation rates in the United Kingdom. While 
they find that nonlinear models behave significantly differently, they cannot provide 
strong evidence of feedback effects in their study. 
24. The VAR is estimated using quarterly data for the United States from the first 
quarter of 1990 to the first quarter of 2008, with a lag-length of four. The ordering is 
nonperforming loans, growth, inflation, and interest rates. Impulse response functions 
are derived using a Cholesky decomposition. Different unit root tests gave different 
messages concerning whether nonperforming loans are stationary; for the purpose of 
this analysis, we assume that they are. As a robustness check we used growth rates 
in nonperforming loans. In this case, the shape of the impulse response functions is 
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by the impulse response functions, the macrofinancial linkages are 
poorly modeled (figure 4). Nonperforming loans respond only to the 
interest rate and little to economic slack or inflation. The response of 
output to nonperforming loans is short-lived, as an easing of monetary 
policy appears to attenuate the blow. Nonperforming loans are largely 
determined by their own lagged behavior.25 Second, just as tellingly, 
even using an extreme stress-test scenario, we cannot replicate the 
actual experience with nonperforming loans (figure 5). We assume that 
a one-off unexpected inflationary shock hits the economy in the first 
quarter of 2007, raising inflation in that quarter from below 2 percent 
to 6 percent. This level was last experienced in early 1989. Inflation 
more than triples within one quarter, compared with an increase of 
at most 75 percent in any one quarter in the sample starting in 1970. 
Arguably, such a scenario would never have been run as a “severe, yet 
plausible” one, something stress tests aim to do. Notwithstanding the 
severity of the scenario, following an initial rise, nonperforming loans 
start to drop back to the baseline after one year, given the properties 
inherent in the VAR model. This type of behavior and results are 
quite typical for VARs and may explain why, to our knowledge, no 
central bank uses VARs on their own for the regular assessment of 
vulnerabilities.
2.1.4 Multiple-module measures: macroeconomic stress tests
The absence of full-fledged structural models and the limitations 
of VARs have encouraged the use of multiple-module approaches 
to the assessment of financial distress: so-called macro stress tests 
generally fall in this category. By analogy with the stress tests 
for the portfolios of individual institutions, macro stress tests 
are designed to form a view of how the system as a whole would 
behave under exceptional but plausible adverse circumstances, 
that is, in response to negative shocks drawn from the tail of the 
underlying probability distribution (IMF and World Bank, 2003).26 
25. Hoggarth, Sorensen, and Zicchino (2005) find some effect of growth on their 
measure of financial stability (write-offs), but no effect in the opposite direction. Also 
in a VAR setup, Carlson, King, and Lewis (2008) find that for the United States a 
higher median EDF for the banking sector depresses the profitability and investment 
of nonfinancial firms. Aspachs and others (2007) look at a panel VAR of seven countries 
and find that their measures of financial fragility decrease GDP.
26. This view can take the form of a point forecast conditional on some unusually 
large shocks or of a whole probability distribution, with its tail representing the outcomes 
of interest (for example, a value-at-risk measure).Figure 4. Impulse Response Functions of a Financial 
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Figure 5. A Simple Stress Test of Nonperforming Loans for 
the United Statesa
Sources: National data; BIS calculations.
a. NPLRATUS: ratio of no-performing loans to total loans. The baseline mean is the mean forecast of NPLRATUS 
assuming no shock, starting in the first quarter of 2007. The scenario 1 mean is the mean forecast of NPLRATUS 
assuming a one-off inflationary shock that increases inflation to 6 percent in the first quarter of 2007. Actual is the 
actual development of NPLRATUS. 
These measures are thus inspired by the negative exogenous shock 
amplification view of financial instability. They effectively replicate 
for the financial system the stress tests individual firms carry out 
on their portfolios.
Despite considerable differences, all macro stress tests share 
some characteristics (Drehmann, 2009).27 A macroeconomic engine—
whether a VAR (for example, Pesaran and others, 2006), a traditional 
macroeconomic model (for example, Bunn, Cunningham, and 
Drehmann, 2005), or a macroeconomic model linked to market risk 
drivers (Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer, 2006)—is used to generate 
the shock or to trace out a scenario for macroeconomic variables, that 
is, the change in the assumed systematic risk factors. These are then 
used to shock the balance sheets of the relevant sector so as to assess 
more precisely their impact on its financial strength, measured in a 
variety of ways (Cihak, 2007). The analogy with banks’ own stress 
tests is obvious.28 Box 1 illustrates in more detail a couple of examples 
representative of the range of more advanced practices.
27. For surveys of the range of practices, see Sorge (2004) and Drehmann 
(2008, 2009).
28. Just as VARs or macroeconomic models draw on the financial accelerator 
literature, stress tests follow banks’ approaches to risk management, which in turn is based 
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Box 1. Multimodule Measures: Some 
Sophisticated Examples
One of the earliest multimodule measurement models was developed 
by Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006) for the Austrian banking sector. It 
is still the most sophisticated model that is actually fully operational, and it 
is used to support both regular and ad hoc financial stability assessments. 
The model integrates market risk, credit risk, interest rate risk, and 
counterparty credit risk in the interbank sector. The model is able to use 
a credit register that has a very extensive coverage of on-balance sheet 
exposures. The model outputs can be represented as loss distributions 
for the whole financial sector or particular banks or as aggregate VaRs. 
The model can also be run in stress-testing mode. Importantly, given the 
information about interbank exposures, the model can trace out how a 
default of one or more banks can spread through the system.29 As banks 
are assumed not to adjust portfolios in reaction to the shocks, the model 
is always run with a one-quarter (single period) horizon.30
Drehmann, Sorensen, and Stringa (2010) are the first to model assets 
and liabilities simultaneously, in a stress-testing exercise that integrates 
credit and interest rate risk in the banking book. The approach ensures that 
banks’ balance sheets balance at each point in time during the simulation 
horizon. While this is a basic accounting identity, it is something all other 
stress-testing models ignore. Given its granularity, the model provides a 
suitable framework to explore the impact on banks’ profits and losses of 
different behavioral rules about the investment behavior of banks once 
assets mature or profits accumulate. Alessandri and others (2009) take 
this model as one basic building block for a financial stability measurement 
model for the United Kingdom, which also captures both market risk and 
counterparty credit risk in the interbank market, albeit very roughly. 
They also include a simple market liquidity component à la Cifuentes, 
Ferrucci, and Shin (2005) as an additional feedback channel.31 Although 
the model structure could offer an interesting starting point, changes in the 
investment behavior of banks are not yet linked back to the macroeconomy, 
so that macroeconomic feedbacks cannot be analyzed. 
Macroeconomic feedbacks are the focus of the work by Jacobson, Linde, 
and Roszbach (2005), who propose a reduced form approach for Sweden 
29. Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer (2006) find that the second-round effects 
associated with counterparty risk in the interbank market are of second-order 
importance in their model. Joint defaults of banks are mostly driven by common 
exposures, such as exposure to systematic risk factors. 
30. A recent version (Boss and others, 2008) extends the horizon to three years and 
makes the assumption that all profits are immediately distributed to shareholders. No 
other reactions are allowed for. 
31. The authors show that these feedback effects can be sizable, but this requires 
very strong and arguably unrealistic assumptions about the market risk component 
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consisting of an aggregate VAR model that includes the average default 
frequency of companies as a measure of financial stability, a model linking 
macroeconomic and balance-sheet-specific factors to company defaults, and a 
module linking the evolution of balance sheets in response to macroeconomic 
factors. By integrating these three building blocks, they show that there are 
significant feedback effects from financial stability back to the real economy. 
Given the nonlinear nature of the model, they can also show that the impact 
of shocks is state dependent. For example, monetary policy seems to be more 
potent in recessions than in booms. De Graeve, Kick, and Koetter (2008) use 
the same methodology but can proxy financial stability more directly, as 
they model the default probability of banks in Germany. They find that bank 
capitalization has significant implications for the transmission mechanism 
of shocks to banks’ balance sheets and back.32
While all these models make important contributions to the stress-
testing literature, none is so far able to combine all the elements, 
because of enormous technical difficulties and a lack of data. Important 
components missing are off-balance-sheet items and funding liquidity. The 
former reflect serious data limitations. As for the latter, combining macro 
stress tests with a marketwide liquidity stress test in line with van den 
End (2008) could be an interesting starting point, although it is doubtful 
that extreme reactions as currently observed can ever be captured. 
Just like the stress tests for individual institutions, macro stress 
tests have become quite popular. They are explicitly forward-looking. 
They have the potential to cover a broad range of scenarios, not 
constrained by the probability distributions derived in estimation. 
They are quite helpful in tracing the propagation mechanism from 
shock to outcome and hence in story telling and communicating 
concerns. Above all, they can be much more granular than other 
approaches, relating scenarios to features of individual balance 
sheets. For example, information about interlinkages in the banking 
sector can be used to calculate knock-on effects from losses at 
individual institutions (Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer, 2006). The 
ultimate measures of distress, therefore, are closer to those that 
capture the concerns of policymakers, such as the erosion in the 
degree of capitalization in the banking system.
Even so, their limitations should not be underestimated. Some 
of these have to do with the shortcomings of the individual modules. 
As already discussed, the macroeconomic modules do a very poor 
job of incorporating financial variables, hardly ever going beyond 
32. In particular, they find that the impact of a monetary policy shock can be six 
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equity prices and interest rates, regardless of whether VARs or other 
macroeconomic models are used.33 Given that the macroeconomic 
model is the source of all shocks in these applications, episodes 
of distress that are not driven by macroeconomic factors cannot 
be simulated. This restricts the use considerably, as events like 
the current crisis cannot be captured. The relationship between 
macroeconomic risk factors and credit risk proxies is also often 
poorly modeled. Additionally, the balance sheets of the financial 
sector generally exclude important items. For example, given the 
enormous data requirements, current models are not able to account 
for off-balance-sheet commitments, an item that has been at the 
heart of the recent crisis.
Other limitations relate to how the modules are linked. For one, 
the modular structure can easily result in internal inconsistencies, 
both conceptual and empirical, such as those that can arise from 
piecewise estimation.34 Moreover, there is a clear danger of excessive 
complexity, undermining robustness and ease of communication, 
both within the organization and with the public. Most importantly, 
greater granularity and relevance are bought at the expense of ruling 
out interactions and feedback effects. After all, these interactions, 
both within the financial system and between the financial system 
and the real economy, lie at the heart of the dynamics of financial 
distress. This is especially serious when the horizon of the simulation 
exceeds one period, as it realistically should. The very fact that 
unusually large shocks are needed to produce any action suggests 
that the current generation of macro stress tests is missing essential 
elements of financial instability. As a result, there is a serious risk 
that macro stress tests, as currently carried out, may underestimate 
the likelihood of financial distress and its potential magnitude.35
This is consistent with recent experience. To our knowledge, all 
the macro stress carried out before the recent financial turmoil failed 
to anticipate it as a possible relevant outcome. The tests indicated 
33. Typical shocks would thus include changes in output, inflation, or, less often, 
oil prices.
34. An easy-to-make mistake would, for example, be to treat interest rates as an 
I(1) variable in one module but as an I(0) in another. 
35. Moreover, from the perspective of the endogenous cycle view of financial 
instability, macro stress tests could at best capture the endgame, since by construction 
they trace out the impact of negative shocks. While this may be very useful in 
understanding the interaction in the financial system during a crisis and the potential 
costs, it may be less suited to identifying potential problems with a sufficient lead time 
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that the capital buffers in the system were perfectly adequate, and yet 
they came under considerable strain once the turmoil erupted.36
2.2 An Overall Assessment
The discussion of quantitative measurement tools points to a 
number of conclusions. First, the technology to measure the likelihood 
of financial distress in real time is still rather rudimentary. The 
tools generally provide little comfort in the estimates, and, with rare 
exceptions, the lead with which distress is assessed is insufficient 
to take remedial action. Most behave more like thermometers than 
true barometers of distress and/or risk, lulling policymakers into 
a false sense of security. At the same time, those EWIs that draw 
on the endogenous cycle perspective on financial instability appear 
comparatively more promising.
Second, to our mind, the reasons for this unsatisfactory 
performance reflect a mixture of factors. For one, financial distress 
is an inherently rare event. This makes estimation with any degree 
of confidence very hard, even if the processes at work do not change 
fundamentally over time. Sufficiently long data series may not be 
available, and when they are, they typically span different economic 
structures, which adds to the uncertainty surrounding inferences. 
The very fact that financial innovation or regime shifts such as 
financial liberalization are common features of crises heightens 
uncertainty (box 2). Relying on other countries’ experience may help, 
but it can also generate further doubt. Moreover, the available tools 
do a very poor job of capturing the interactions and nonlinearities 
that lie at the heart of financial instability. They are unable to 
capture its essence, namely, outsized responses to normal-sized 
shocks. And there is considerable disagreement on what is the best 
analytical framework to guide the analysis.
Finally, all this implies that the available quantitative tools do 
not impose sufficient discipline on the judgmental assessments of 
vulnerabilities routinely carried out in national and international 
forums (Borio and Shim, 2007). On the one hand, there has been 
36. In principle, one could envisage a highly complementary use of EWIs and 
macroeconomic stress tests (for example, Borio, 2003a). The former can be used to 
measure the likelihood of distress, the latter its cost conditional on distress. As the 
above analysis suggests, however, the inconsistencies between the two types of tools 
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an excessive tendency to look at everything without a good sense of 
just how to look at everything. On the other hand, there is still too 
much room for quasi-philosophical priors concerning the strength of 
the stabilizing or destabilizing nature of market forces to influence 
the final judgments.
Box 2. Financial Liberalization and Innovation:  
A Problem for Measurement Models
All measurement models discussed rely on historical data to uncover 
the embedded behavioral relationships. Given this constraint and the 
typical estimation methods, the models mainly capture average past 
relationships among the data series, rather than how the series interact 
under stress. The reliance on past data also implies that these models are 
not well suited to capturing innovations or changes in market structure. 
And yet, innovations—be they financial, such as structured credit 
products, or real, such as the invention of railways—are often at the 
center of the build-up of imbalances and the following distress. Similarly, 
it is not uncommon for financial liberalization episodes to trigger a boom 
that may prove unsustainable while at the same time changing certain 
characteristics of the economy.37
Even though this is rarely done, stress tests can help to challenge 
the projected risk characteristics of new products where limited or 
no historical data are available.38 This requires making assumptions 
about the behavior of new products. In practice, this implies that the 
characteristics of new products may be approximated by those of others 
for which historical information is available. This process involves 
potential pitfalls.
To illustrate this point, we implement a micro stress test for a 
portfolio of asset-backed securities (ABS) exposures, following a procedure 
that was not uncommon prior to the crisis. The typical assumption was 
to proxy the default characteristics of ABS by those of corporate bonds 
of the same rating category. Based on this assumption, we implement a 
severe stress test scenario starting in February 2007.39 An unspecified 
37. The EWIs discussed in box 1 are also subject to the criticism that they rely on 
historical relationships to predict future crises. However, they seek to focus on factors 
that past experience indicates have been invariant across policy regimes and periods 
of financial innovations. 
38. See Bunn, Cunningham, and Drehmann (2005) for how this can be done in the 
context of macro stress testing. 
39. Actual price levels are based on the ABX index from J.P. Morgan for the 2006.1 
vintage for different ratings. The treatment of correlations is crucial for the pricing and 
evolution of structured credit products (Fender, Tarashev, and Zhu, 2008). This stress 
test implements a very simplistic correlation structure. It assumes that defaults occur 
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shock is assumed to lead to defaults in each rating category equal to the 
highest default rates ever observed for corporate bonds in that category. 
These are essentially default rates from the Great Depression. In addition, 
nondefaulted exposures experience a drop in prices that is three times 
the worst annual return on corporate bond indexes for the various ratings 
over the period 1990 to the beginning of 2007.
Figure 6. Stress Testing New Productsa
Sources: J.P. Morgan; BIS calculation.
a. The figure illustrates a simple test that proxies ABS with corporate bonds. ABS tranches are assumed 
to behave like bonds of the same rating category. The stress test scenario starts in February 2007. An 
unspecified shock is assumed to lead to defaults in each rating category equal to the highest default 
rates ever observed for corporate bonds in that category. In addition, nondefaulted exposures experience 
a drop in prices that is three times the worst annual return on corporate bond indexes for the various 
ratings over the period from 1990 to the beginning of 2007. Solid lines plot actual market prices for the 
ABS index from J.P. Morgan for 2006:1 vintage for different ratings. Dotted lines plot the impact of the 
hypothetical stress test for different ratings. Impact for BBB ratings is worse than for A, but it is hard 
to distinguish in the figure. 
Only for AAA ratings is the outcome of this stress test worse than 
actual developments, while the impact for all other categories is much 
more benign. Admittedly, more appropriate pricing models should have 
fared better. But to replicate actual price developments, given the typical 
assumptions used at the time, it is likely that rather extreme scenarios 
would have been needed—something which is arguably not consistent 
with the stress tests’ focus on “severe yet plausible” scenarios.
A more general point is apparent from eyeballing the graph. By 
definition, only limited data is available for new products and none of that 
would be taken from a crisis. Understanding the true statistical properties 
is therefore difficult, if not impossible, from an ex ante perspective. 
Arguably, measurement models built on these statistical relationships 
will break down in precisely those scenarios that they aim to capture 
beforehand—a problem that is present for many financial times series 
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3. TowaRD an opeRaTional fRamewoRk: a way foRwaRD
The above discussion indicates that the analytical basis for an 
operational financial stability framework is not very satisfactory. 
The definition of financial (in)stability has a number of agreed 
elements, but it is not very precise. There is no unified analytical 
framework that commands a broad consensus. The state of 
quantitative measurement is poor. As a result, measurement is 
fundamentally fuzzy.
At the same time, the shortcomings of this analytical basis should 
not be overstated, especially once the dual role of measurement 
is acknowledged. Rather, the operational framework should 
recognize both the known and the unknown elements. Overall, 
the analysis does point to a number of desirable features that any 
such framework could have and, by implication, to helpful steps 
forward. Some of the features are independent of the specific view 
one may have of the nature of financial instability, while others 
call for more of a stand on this issue.
3.1 Desirable Features: From Microprudential to 
Macroprudential
We highlight six desirable features. First, any operational 
financial stability framework would have a macroprudential, as 
opposed to microprudential, orientation (table 1; see Crockett, 2000; 
Borio, 2003a; Knight, 2006). It would focus on the financial system 
as a whole, as opposed to individual institutions. The failure of 
individual institutions, regardless of the implication for the system, 
does not amount to financial instability. The framework would 
also explicitly treat aggregate risk as endogenous with respect to 
the collective behavior of institutions rather than as exogenous, as 
individual economic agents would tend to do. This would help to 
address the wedge between actions that are rational for individual 
agents, but that collectively do not result in desirable outcomes.
Second, while distinctions are hard to make within the financial 
sector, some institutions deserve more attention than others. 
Institutions that are highly leveraged or engaged in substantial 
liquidity transformation are more vulnerable than institutions 
that are not. If they further have large outstanding liabilities, are 
highly interconnected, or play key roles (such as wholesale payment 
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their failure would be particularly disruptive for the system as a 
whole.40 At the same time, broad coverage is critical. For example, 
even if individually small, a large set of institutions could raise 
serious risks for the system as a whole if they are exposed to 
similar common risk factors. Moreover, the features that make 
institutions especially relevant for financial stability hardly apply 
to banks only.
Third,  in  the  cross-section  at  a  given  point  in  time,  a 
macroprudential approach highlights the importance of common 
exposures across financial firms, that is, exposures to systematic 
risk.41 This holds true regardless of whether these exposures are 
direct, arising from claims on the nonfinancial sector, or indirect, 
40. The general point (also noted by Morris and Shin, 2008) is that institutions 
with a high systemic impact factor deserve special attention or tighter standards owing 
to the implications of their distress for the system as a whole.
41. For theoretical analyses of the implications for the prudential framework of 
the distinction between systematic and idiosyncratic risk, including for issues such as 
diversification, see Acharya (2001) and Wagner (2008, 2010).
Table 1. A Comparison of the Macro- and Micro-prudential 
Perspectivesa
Trait  Macroprudential Microprudential
Proximate objective To limit distress across  
the financial system  
as a whole
To limit distress in 
individual institutions
Ultimate objective To avoid output (GDP)  
costs linked to financial 
instability 
To provide consumer 




Dependent on collective 
behavior (endogenous)








In terms of systemwide  
risk; top-down
In terms of the risks of 
individual institutions; 
bottom-up
Source: Borio (2003a). 
a. As defined, the two perspectives are intentionally stylized. They are intended to highlight two orientations 
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reflecting exposures to each other. Other things equal, the higher 
the exposure to systematic risk, the higher is the threat to the 
financial system as a whole, as the institution is likely to incur 
losses at the same time as the other institutions, making it harder 
to absorb them.42 This is bound to strengthen the endogenous 
amplifying mechanisms that generate financial distress and 
increase its cost for the real economy. As a result, a key principle 
of the approach is to calibrate prudential tools so as to increase 
the weight on systematic risk relative to idiosyncratic risk: at 
present, prudential requirements are generally set based on the 
overall risk profile of individual institutions, without making any 
distinction between the two.
Fourth,  in  the  time  dimension,  the  key  principle  of  a 
macroprudential approach is to dampen the procyclicality of the 
financial system. This means encouraging the buildup of buffers 
(for example, in terms of institutions’ capital and funding liquidity) 
in good times, during the expansion phase, so that they can be run 
down, in a controlled way, as harder times materialize and financial 
strains threaten to emerge. The buildup of buffers would strengthen 
the system’s resilience to the emergence of incipient distress as 
long as the buffers were allowed to operate as such. Crucially, this 
implies a willingness to allow them to be run down, since otherwise 
they act as minima and become shock amplifiers rather than shock 
absorbers. In addition, to the extent that it behaved as a kind of 
dragging anchor, the buildup of buffers could also restrain risk-
taking and any balance sheet overextension during the expansion. 
This, in turn, could mitigate the influence of any incentives to take 
on risk resulting from the anticipation of public support in the event 
of systemic distress (moral hazard).43
Fifth, the operational framework would rely as far as possible on 
built-in (automatic) stabilizers rather than discretion. This would 
help address the limitations in the measurement of aggregate risks 
in real time, which can make discretionary action error-prone. 
And it would limit the danger that, even when risks are correctly 
identified, no action may be taken for fear of going against the 
manifest view of markets. The widespread failure to anticipate the 
42. See, in particular, Hellwig (1995) on the pitfalls of assessing the soundness of 
institutions in isolation as opposed to in a system context.
43. See Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007) for a formalization of this point.100 Claudio Borio and Mathias Drehmann
recent credit crisis and take remedial action, even when general 
risks were identified, has hammered this message home.44 Once in 
place, automatic stabilizers do not require continuous justification, 
and they can thus act as an effective precommitment device. They 
leave little room for policy error provided they are linked to robust 
aspects of the financial cycle and are not too ambitious. Importantly, 
the corresponding measure need not track systemwide risk perfectly, 
but just provide a rough gauge. For example, it would be sufficient 
that the evolution of the stabilizers is related to some robust aspects 
of financial conditions measured relative to average historical 
experience (see below).
At the same time, automatic stabilizers and discretionary 
measures should not necessarily be seen as mutually exclusive. 
Discretionary measures could complement automatic stabilizers if 
the latter faced design limitations. Likewise, they might be more 
easily tailored to the nature of the buildup in risk-taking and 
vulnerabilities as long as these are identifiable in real time. They may 
also be harder to arbitrage away, as circumvention becomes easier 
over time. The key issue would be how to constrain and discipline 
any such discretion.
Finally, institutionally, any operational financial stability 
framework would align objectives with the control over relevant 
instruments and the know-how to use them. This is difficult. Financial 
stability is a task on which a whole range of policies have a bearing, 
well beyond prudential policies. Even within prudential arrangements, 
the institutional setup is often not particularly conducive to an 
effective implementation of the macroprudential orientation. Not least, 
mandates tend to have a microprudential orientation. In particular, 
the presence of depositor or investor protection in the statutes of some 
supervisory authorities is not easily reconcilable with a systemwide 
perspective. Moreover, the embedded culture and expertise may not 
44. To be sure, signs of building vulnerabilities were not hard to detect, especially 
if seen from the perspective of the endogenous cycle view of instability. Several 
observers, including in the official sector, did not hold back warnings to that effect, 
albeit sometimes in coded or guarded language (for example, BIS, 2005, 2006, 2007; 
Knight, 2007; IMF, 2007; ECB, 2007; Bank of England, 2007; Geithner, 2007). Even 
so, there was a general tendency to overestimate the system’s ability to withstand 
shocks and to take comfort from what, on the surface, appeared to be strong levels of 
capitalization and better risk management practices. Actual policy action to rein in 
risk-taking was limited, not least out of a concern that tightening prudential standards 
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be sufficient even when the instruments are available.45 This may 
be less of an issue where central banks are in charge of supervision, 
given their natural comparative advantage in macroeconomic issues, 
but it could be relevant elsewhere, where legal and accounting 
backgrounds are the rule.
3.2 Next Steps
What are the most promising next steps to edge closer to an 
effective operational financial stability framework? We consider three 
aspects in turn: improving the measurement of risk; strengthening 
the architecture of prudential arrangements; and putting in place an 
institutional setup that supports the framework. As already noted, 
we focus only on prevention.
3.2.1 Measurement of risk
The overall objective in risk measurement would be to improve 
the way low-frequency, systemwide risks are evaluated. Better risk 
measures could be used not only for the calibration of policymakers’ 
tools, but also as inputs in firms’ own risk assessments.
Our analysis suggests a set of priorities in this area. First, 
analytically, major steps are needed to develop better models of 
financial instability, marrying micro- and macroeconomic aspects. 
A priority is to explicitly incorporate endogenous amplifying 
mechanisms. At present, no such operational models exist. Without 
them, for instance, there is a serious danger that macro stress tests 
will lull policymakers into a false sense of security.46 
Second, for monitoring and calibration purposes, it is important 
to develop better information about the interlinkages and common 
exposures in the financial system. As some of this information is 
bound to be regarded as confidential, it would have to be reported 
to the authorities and not disclosed publicly (Borio and Tsatsaronis, 
2004, 2006). 
45. Control over instruments is often imperfect or limited, especially when 
other types of authorities are involved, such as those responsible for accounting and 
taxation.
46. These limitations extend to models used for monetary policy. Despite confidence 
in their performance, their inability to capture the build-up of financial instability 
and the consequences of the materialization of financial distress can clearly lead 
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Finally, for the immediate future, working on EWIs appears 
more promising than on macro stress tests. We expect improvements 
in macro stress tests to require considerable time, owing to the 
analytical and informational demands involved. As long as EWIs 
are not too ambitious, they can help to highlight general risks to 
the financial system. Arguably, as suggested by recent empirical 
evidence, developing indicators that draw on the endogenous 
cycle view of financial instability is the most fruitful route. These 
indicators could be refined through better measures of financial 
system leverage and risk-taking, based on either price or balance 
sheet information.47
3.2.2 Architecture of prudential arrangements
The overall objective in structuring prudential arrangements 
would be to strengthen their macroprudential orientation, both in the 
cross-sectional and time dimensions. Consider each in turn. In the 
cross-section, there are a number of ways of calibrating prudential 
tools so as to increase the weight on systematic risk relative to 
idiosyncratic risk. One could deliberately seek to estimate separately 
the exposures of individual institutions to the two sources of risk; 
alternatively, simpler proxies could be used based on the composition 
of balance sheets.48 Similarly, for a given exposure to systematic 
sources of risk, institutions whose distress had a larger impact on 
47. Our analysis also points to a potentially serious limitation of this work as an 
input into individual firms’ own risk assessments, in that they are even more vulnerable 
to two shortcomings than policymakers’ assessments (Borio, Furfine, and Lowe, 2001; 
Lowe, 2002). First, they make no attempt to endogenize risk with respect to the 
collective behavior of economic agents. Second, they tend to focus on short horizons; 
in the case of banks, for instance, horizons range from a few days for trading books 
to at most one year for loan books, making it more likely to assume the continuation 
of current conditions. These shortcomings can easily lead to highly procyclical risk 
measures that underestimate systemwide risk and its repercussions on the firms’ own 
balance sheets. The problem here is that even if improvements in risk measurement 
technology were achieved, distortions in incentives of individual firms would remain. 
They would hinder the lengthening of the horizon and could induce them to target 
levels of risk tolerance and risk-taking that, from the perspective of the system as a 
whole, could be inappropriate.
48. An example of the former comprises statistical techniques designed to measure 
the sensitivity of an institution’s return on assets to common risk factors. An example 
of the latter includes balance sheet exposures to sectors/industries (for example, real 
estate) and types of particularly cyclically sensitive activities (for example, leveraged 
buyouts). For example, tighter prudential standards or concentration limits could be 
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the system as a whole would also be subject to tighter standards, 
given their importance as sources of indirect exposures in the system. 
Size is one relevant factor.49 Building on existing arrangements, 
the increased weight on systematic risk could be achieved through 
transparent adjustments in the calibration of current prudential tools 
specifically designed to capture this aspect (what might be termed 
a macroprudential overlay).
In the time dimension, there are several options to address the 
procyclicality of the financial system through the offsetting behavior 
of prudential cushions. As this has been extensively discussed in 
other work (for example, Borio, Furfine, and Lowe, 2001; Borio, 
2003a; Borio and Shim, 2007), we highlight only a number of 
general considerations here. First, a holistic approach is needed. A 
broad range of policies have an impact on the procyclicality of the 
system. Thus, the required adjustments in the prudential framework 
will depend on the characteristics of other policies and on any 
adjustments made to them. For example, the current trend toward 
fair value accounting is likely to add to procyclicality by making 
valuations more sensitive to the economic cycle, as it embeds evolving 
estimates of future cash flows and risk premia in the accounting 
figures (for example, Borio and Tsatsaronis, 2004; Goodhart, 2004; 
Adrian and Shin, 2008). Other obvious examples with a potential 
first-order effect on procyclicality include the characteristics of 
deposit insurance schemes, of resolution procedures, and of the 
monetary policy regime in place.50
Second, within prudential arrangements, while a lot of attention 
has been devoted to capital requirements, several other possibilities 
are also worth considering. As a preliminary step, prudential filters 
can be applied to accounting figures to offset undesirable features, 
such as loan provisioning rules that are not sufficiently forward-
49. To some extent, these arrangements are already in place in a number of 
jurisdictions (see Borio, 2009).
50. By comparison with prefunded deposit insurance, unfunded (survivor pays) 
insurance schemes increase procyclicality in the face of systemwide strains by requiring 
payments precisely when capital is more scarce for institutions. See Kashyap, Rajan, 
and Stein (2008) for a proposal to set up systemic insurance schemes activated by 
aggregate losses in the system. The same can be true of resolution procedures that 
are not conditional on the degree of stress in the financial system as a whole. Finally, 
monetary policy frameworks that focus narrowly on the pursuit of price stability over 
short horizons may unwittingly accommodate the build-up of financial imbalances if 
these take place when inflation remains low and stable (Borio and Lowe, 2002a; Borio 
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looking and prudent (see below). Since the availability of funding 
liquidity is procyclical, funding liquidity standards that rely on 
quantitative minimum requirements that are invariant to the 
state of the economy risk exacerbating financial strains once they 
emerge, by acting as shock amplifiers rather than shock absorbers.51 
Increasing variation margins when volatility spikes can have a 
similar effect (CGFS, 1999; Borio, 2003b). High minimum loan-to-
value ratios can add to procyclicality by increasing the sensitivity of 
the supply of credit to the assets used as collateral (Borio, Furfine, 
and Lowe, 2001). Arrangements could therefore be adjusted in all 
of these areas.
Third, at the same time, capital standards remain a key potential 
area for adjustment, given their central role and far-reaching effects. 
The spectrum of options for regulatory capital ranges from reducing 
its cyclical risk sensitivity to deliberately introducing elements of 
countercyclicality within the existing framework. There are various 
ways to accomplish this (Gordy and Howells, 2006). Examples include 
strengthening the through-the-cycle orientation of minimum capital 
requirements; setting the corresponding risk parameters based on 
smoothed outputs of financial institutions’ internal risk models; 
and adding a countercyclical adjustment to the minima based on 
measures of the financial cycle (a form of macroprudential overlay). 
The adjustments could be hardwired to the minima (Pillar 1 in Basel 
II) or encouraged through the supervisory review process (Pillar 2).
Fourth, there are a number of areas in which automatic 
stabilizers could be considered. In the area of collateral requirements, 
possibilities include seeking to implement through-the-cycle 
margining requirements (Geithner, 2006) and enforcing minimum 
loan-to-value ratios that are comparatively low and/or based on 
valuations that are less sensitive to market prices. Similarly, 
supervisors may consider that accounting standards do not allow 
for sufficiently forward-looking or prudent provisions, such as not 
permitting through-the-cycle provisions for loans (sometimes known 
as dynamic provisions) based on average historical experience, in 
51. For a discussion of liquidity standards that take a systemwide perspective 
into account, see Borio (2003b) and Morris and Shin (2008). Note that while Morris 
and Shin talk about putting in place liquidity requirements they presumably mean 
liquidity buffers, since state or time (state) invariant liquidity requirements would act 
as amplifiers at times of stress. For a discussion of the interaction between market and 
funding liquidity, see Borio (2003b), for its theoretical modeling, Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2007), and, for a survey, Shim and von Peter (2007).105 Toward an Operational Framework for Financial Stability
place until recently in Spain (Fernández de Lis, Martínez Pagés, 
and Saurina, 2001). In that case, they can add the difference 
between what they find appropriate and the accounting figures 
to minimum capital requirements.52 Importantly, adjustments to 
capital standards within the existing framework could be made 
based on specific rules rather than discretion. A possibility worth 
examining would be to index the macroprudential overlay to some 
measure of the financial cycle. For example, one could tie capital 
standards inversely to measures of risk premia or indicators of 
market perceptions of financial institutions’ strength, exploiting 
their thermometer characteristics. Alternatively, one could tie them 
positively to aggregate credit growth or asset prices relative to trend, 
exploiting their barometer features.
Finally, regardless of the specifics, for arrangements to be 
successful they will need to constrain the room for regulatory arbitrage, 
both across countries and between the regulated and unregulated 
sectors. Across countries, this raises thorny issues of coordination 
between home and host authorities.53 The harder challenge, however, 
is how to constrain behavior outside the regulated sector. To the 
extent that an indirect approach based on restrictions on the regulated 
institutions proved insufficient, the extension of the coverage of 
prudential instruments would need to be considered.
3.2.3 Institutional setup
Two key issues that need to be addressed in the institutional 
setup for the implementation of the framework are the needs to 
ensure accountability and to align objectives with the available know-
how. Accountability calls for a clear mandate, transparency, and 
effective processes to hold policymakers responsible. Accountability 
52. Admittedly, this is less effective than directly adjusting accounting standards. 
Even if publicly disclosed, such prudential provisions may be less effective in reducing 
procyclicality than if dynamic provisions were allowed for accounting purposes: since 
they are not charged against current income, prudential provisions forgo the disciplinary 
effect that operates through the market’s focus on earnings (the bottom line). Even 
so, they can help constrain dividend payments during expansions, thereby increasing 
the size of the capital buffers, and they release buffers when losses materialize and 
accounting provisions spike.
53. Financial and real conditions may and do differ across countries. For institutions 
with international operations, this would suggest calibrating instruments with respect 
to their individual consolidated exposures to the corresponding country’s conditions 
rather than in terms of the nationality or residence of the firm. These exposures could 
derive from cross-border lending or direct operations in host countries.106 Claudio Borio and Mathias Drehmann
is especially important for disciplining any reliance on discretion 
that complements automatic stabilizers. It can generally be 
enhanced by making sure that the measures used are as simple and 
transparent as possible. One could imagine a setup similar to the one 
now being employed for monetary policy. At the same time, given 
the lags involved and the inevitable “fuzziness” in definition and 
measurement, it would be unrealistic to expect that an equivalent 
degree of accountability and transparency is feasible.
Addressing the imperfect alignment of goals, instruments, and 
know-how in the institutional setup is a difficult and controversial 
task. At a minimum, a financial stability framework with a 
macroprudential orientation requires close cooperation between a 
broad range of authorities with respect to both its development and 
implementation. The close bearing on financial stability of a wide 
range of policies, under the responsibility of authorities with very 
different perspectives, requires this.
At the same time, a key ingredient of success is to leverage the 
comparative advantage of the various authorities involved. This 
is especially important for monetary and prudential authorities. 
Monetary authorities have an edge in understanding the nexus 
between the macroeconomy, the financial system, and the functioning 
of financial markets. Prudential authorities have an edge in 
understanding the risk management practices of the regulated 
institutions. For instance, one could set up special committees 
involving these types of authority charged with implementing 
those macroprudential overlays in regulatory and supervisory tools 
executed on a discretionary basis.
4. ConClusion
The measurement of financial (in)stability is fundamentally 
fuzzy. This reflects a number of factors, including a lack of consensus 
on the most appropriate analytical framework, the infrequent 
incidence of episodes of financial distress, and limitations in the 
available measurement tools. These tools are very poor at capturing 
the feedback effects that are at the heart of financial instability 
and that operate both within the financial system and between 
the financial system and the real economy. At their best, they can 
provide indications of the general buildup in risks. As a result, there 
is always a danger that policymakers may be lulled into a false sense 
of security.107 Toward an Operational Framework for Financial Stability
No doubt these shortcomings are serious: there is a urgent 
need for further analytical and empirical work to address them. 
We have suggested what the most promising directions might be. 
But notwithstanding them, there is still ample scope for progress 
in establishing a more effective operational framework for financial 
stability as long as these shortcomings are fully taken into account.
We have argued that progress can be made in several ways: 
by strengthening the macroprudential orientation of financial 
regulation and supervision; by addressing the procyclicality of the 
financial system more systematically; by relying as far as possible 
on automatic stabilizers, rather than discretion, while disciplining 
the use of any such discretion; and by setting up institutional 
arrangements that leverage the comparative expertise of the various 
authorities involved in safeguarding financial stability, not least 
financial supervisors and central banks. The global credit crisis that 
has engulfed financial systems since the summer of 2007 provides a 
unique opportunity for steps in this direction.108 Claudio Borio and Mathias Drehmann
aPPendix 
Endogenous Cycles and EWIs
This appendix is a first, preliminary attempt to update and 
extend the EWIs developed by Borio and Lowe (2002a, 2002b, 2004) 
and to assess how they would have fared prior to the current crisis.54 
It refines the previous indicators by introducing property prices 
alongside equity prices.
As discussed in the main text, Borio and Lowe’s approach is 
grounded in the endogenous cycle view of financial instability. They 
argue that the coexistence of unusually rapid credit growth and asset 
price increases indicates the buildup of financial imbalances that raise 
the likelihood of subsequent financial distress. They develop EWIs 
drawing on a large set of industrial and emerging market countries. 
Their proxy for misaligned asset prices is an asset price gap, measured 
by the deviation of inflation-adjusted (real) equity prices from their 
long-term trend; and that for credit booms is a credit gap (measured by 
deviations of the ratio of private sector credit to GDP from its trend). 
The trends are calculated on the basis of one-sided Hodrick-Prescott 
filters. Borio and Lowe assess various combinations and thresholds and 
find that for industrial countries, the EWI has the best performance 
in terms of low noise-to-signal ratio as well as the percentage of crises 
predicted when a warning signal is issued if the credit gap exceeds 4 
percentage points and the equity price gap is greater than 40 percent.55 
Flexible horizons are incorporated by analyzing forecast intervals that 
vary in length, from one to three years ahead.56
One drawback of that analysis, as already pointed out at the time, 
is that property prices were not included in the indicator. With the 
benefit of a few more observations, we extend the analysis to include 
54. See Borio and Drehmann (2009) for a more detailed discussion of the issues 
raised in the appendix.
55. The noise-to-signal ratio is the ratio of the fraction of type II errors (that is, 
the number of false positive signals issued relative to noncrisis periods) over one minus 
the fraction of type I errors (that is, the number of instances in which no signal was 
issued relative to the number of crises observed). Several studies minimize the noise-
to-signal ratio and thereby weigh both types of error equally (for example, Kaminsky 
and Reinhart, 1999). Borio and Lowe argue that equal weighting is not appropriate 
for practical policy purposes, and they apply judgment to derive what constitutes the 
best threshold, giving more weight to type I errors.
56. They assume that the signal is correct if a crisis occurs in any of the years 
included in the horizon. For example, for a three-year horizon, a correct signal is given 
if the credit gap and the equity gap jointly exceed their corresponding thresholds least 
in one of the three years prior to a crisis.109 Toward an Operational Framework for Financial Stability
them. This is critical to make proper inferences in the current episode, 
where the lag between the peak in equity and property prices has been 
considerably longer than in previous episodes (Borio and McGuire, 
2004). The exercise is carried out for 18 industrial countries.57 
We construct a credit gap, an equity gap and a property price gap. 
The property price gap combines both residential and commercial 
property prices, with weights that are rough estimates of their shares 
in private sector wealth. We then assess the performance of the EWI 
in terms of the percent of crises predicted and the noise-to-signal ratio 
for different thresholds, estimating the best indicators through a grid 
search. We carry out the analysis in sample (up to 2003) and then 
forecast out of sample, over the remaining years, ending in 2007, the 
last full year for which we have data, and in 2008 for the information 
concerning the crises. Table A1 summarizes the results.
In sample, we find that the best performance is achieved if the 
credit gap exceeds 6 percent and at the same time either the equity 
gap exceeds 60 percent or the property gap exceeds a threshold that 
ranges from 15 to 25 percent. Especially for horizons of up to two 
years, a threshold of 15 percent is relatively attractive, as it predicts 
a high proportion of crises (about 70 percent), although it produces a 
higher percentage of false alarms. For a horizon of up to three years, 
a higher threshold is preferable, as financial distress does eventually 
emerge and the noise-to-signal ratio is lower. As expected, the 
predictive power increases and the noise-to-signal ratio decreases as 
the horizon is lengthened, confirming that the timing of the reversal 
of the financial imbalance is very hard to predict. Comparing the 
different thresholds, it is apparent that a higher threshold implies 
lower predictive power, but also a lower noise-to-signal ratio.
How do the indicators perform in the more recent period? As 
an illustration, figure A1 plots the credit and property gaps for the 
Unites States, the epicenter of the crisis. We do not plot the equity 
57. The countries included in the sample are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. We use annual 
data. Our sample size is restricted by the property price indexes, which combines retail 
and commercial property indexes and which for most countries are available only from 
1970 onward. All gaps are measured as percentage deviations from a one-sided Hodrick-
Prescott trend (with lambda = 1,600), which only uses information that is available at 
the point in time the prediction is made. A gap is only calculated if at least ten years of 
data are available. Therefore, the sample used for the calibration of the thresholds is from 
1980 to 2003. In this period, 13 crises occurred. The timing of crisis is based on Borio and 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 111 Toward an Operational Framework for Financial Stability
price gap, since it was exceeded at the time of the dot-com boom, but 
subsequently turned negative.
Figure A1. Estimated Gaps for the United Statesa
A. Credit/GDP gapb
B. Real property price gapc
Source: BIS calculations.
a. Gaps are estimated using a rolling Hodrick-Prescott filter with lambda set to 1,600. The horizontal dashed lines 
refer to the threshold values that define the existence of a boom: 6 percent for credit/GDP gap; 15 percent for real 
property price gap.
b. In percentage points.
c. Refers to the residential property price component. 
d. In percent; refers to combined residential and commercial property prices.
The figure suggests that the indicator would have picked up the 
vulnerabilities. Taken at face value, signs of vulnerabilities began to 
emerge as far back as 2001, as both the credit gap and the property 
price gap started to exceed the critical threshold jointly, at least if 
the residential component of the property price index is measured by 
the Case-Shiller ten-city index. If the less variable Office of Federal 112 Claudio Borio and Mathias Drehmann
Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) index is used, the threshold 
is reached only in 2005.58 
A more formal out-of-sample exercise covering all the industrial 
countries for which data are available is harder to perform at this 
early stage, in the midst of the turmoil. At least two problems emerge. 
First, given that the flexible horizon extends up to three years, we 
can only fully assess the predictive content of the signals issued in 
2004; for subsequent ones the full horizon has not yet materialized. 
Second, and more importantly, defining which country is in distress 
is not unambiguous. This highlights some of the issues raised in 
assessing financial instability, especially in real time.
To address the ambiguity in the identification of the crisis, we 
adopt two definitions, going from the more to the less restrictive:59
—Definition 1: Countries where more than one large bank 
failed or had to be supported by the government in an emergency 
operation;60
—Definition 2: Countries that undertook at least one of the 
following policy operations: extend deposit insurance guarantees 
beyond the household sector, buy assets, or undertake capital 
injections.61
58. The gap based on property prices using the Case-Shiller aggregate index is 
in between the other two and breaches the critical threshold in 2003. The in-sample 
estimates presented in table A1 are unaffected by the choice of the property price 
measure for the United States.
59. The cut-off date for this analysis was 20 October 2008, and depending on 
future developments, the classifications of which country is in turmoil may change. For 
simplicity, we assume that crises start in 2007, even though most policy measures were 
adopted in 2008. We also used the alternative assumption that all crises started in 2008. 
In this case, one problem is that for four countries (Belgium, Canada, Denmark, and the 
United Kingdom), residential and/or commercial property prices are not available for 
2007, so that the property gap cannot be fully estimated. Based on judgmental estimates, 
we found comparable results, except that the crisis in Belgium can also be successfully 
predicted. For exploratory reasons, we used two additional crisis definitions. Definition 
2(a) is similar to definition 2 except that it identifies a crisis if countries adopted at 
least two of the policy measures; the results are very similar to those for definition 2. 
Definition 2(b) is the least restrictive, as it includes any of the policy measures listed 
in definition 2, as well as an expansion of the coverage of deposit insurance for retail 
deposits. As all countries except for Japan have implemented at least one of these 
policies, the noise-to-signal ratio drops to zero since our EWI correctly predicts that 
Japan is not a crisis country.
60. The countries that are in a crisis according to this definition are the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium.
61. We take account of policy actions which have been announced but may not yet 
be fully implemented. The countries that are in a crisis according to this definition are 
Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.113 Toward an Operational Framework for Financial Stability
Based on definition 1, only three countries have faced a crisis, 
namely, the United States, the United Kingdom, and Belgium. 
Based on definition 2, fourteen of the eighteen countries have 
faced distress.
On balance, the performance of the indicator is encouraging, 
although far from perfect and a function of the definition used. The 
variant of the indicator based on the lowest threshold for property 
prices (15 percent) performs best, while the others fail to pick a 
significant number of cases. moreover, while the noise-of-signal 
ratio increases considerably compared with the in-sample estimates, 
a look behind the aggregate numbers is quite revealing. With 
definition 1, the indicator picks two out of three cases independent 
of the forecast horizon; the one missed is Belgium. With definition 
2, the three-year indicator picks nine out of the fourteen crises; 
those missed are Belgium, Canada, Germany, the Netherlands, 
and Switzerland. At the same time, only two false positive signals 
are issued, for Denmark and New Zealand. 
The results suggest a number of observations. First, while the 
indicator does identify distress in the country that has been at the 
epicenter of the crisis such as the United States, it fails to pick the 
international transmission of the problems. In particular, it does not 
capture those cases in which banks have run into trouble as a result 
of losses on their international exposures in the absence of signs 
of financial imbalances in the domestic economy, most notably in 
Germany and Switzerland.62 This is no surprise, since by construction 
the indicator assumes that banks in any given country are exposed 
only to the financial cycle in that country. Obviously, this is an aspect 
that calls for improvement and has implications for the calibration of 
prudential arrangements (see the main text). Second, the countries 
for which the indicator issues false positive signals include two that 
have exhibited sizable booms and one institution has already failed 
in at least one of them (Denmark). We may need to wait longer to 
see exactly how the indicator performs.
A broader issue is also apparent. Which definition of distress 
is more appropriate? Definition 1 excludes preventive policies 
designed to deal with the threat of imminent distress, whereas 
62. Canada and the Netherlands exceed the threshold in terms of either credit 
growth or property prices, but not both. In Belgium, the property price gap in 2006 
was 14.45, just below the threshold. Furthermore, in 2007, the credit gap was above 
10. Even though data are only available until mid-2007, they suggest that the property 
price gap in this year would also have been greater than 15.114 Claudio Borio and Mathias Drehmann
definition 2 includes them. Conceptually, definition 2 is arguably 
more appropriate. We take the view that the extraordinary measures 
included in the definition are forms of crisis management, rather 
than prevention: the system should be capable of being stable without 
them. At the same time, this ambiguity does highlight the grey 
area that exists when the authorities try to intervene quite early 
in the game, before more obvious signs of insolvency are apparent. 
These ambiguities are compounded when actions are taken partly to 
address the spillover effects of policies taken in other countries. The 
extension of guarantees to prevent a drain of funding in the domestic 
market is an obvious example. Would distress fail to materialize 
without them? This type of policy contagion is quite novel in recent 
experience and reflects the global nature of the crisis when several 
highly interdependent financial systems are facing incipient strains 
simultaneously.
Overall, we conclude that the recent credit crisis confirms the 
usefulness of the family of indicators rooted on the endogenous cycle 
view of financial instability. At the same time, it also highlights some 
of their limitations and the potential scope for improvement.115 Toward an Operational Framework for Financial Stability
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